Railroad Leases and Reorganization: I by Meck, John M. & Masten, John E.
RAILROAD LEASES AND REORGANIZATION: I
By JOHN F. MECK, JR.t and JOHN E. MASTENt
THE decade which has just closed witnessed many trying years for
railroads and their security holders. The unprecedented number of reor-
ganization proceedings instituted in those ten years, together with various
remedial proposals, tended to focus public attention on their problems.
These problems necessarily involve the legal framework within which
the railroad industry is carried on, an important segment of which is the
long term lease. Railroad history has been such that in earlier periods
of financial stress the mortgage device has played the conspicuous role,
while the part of the lease has been relatively obscure. Between 1930
and 1940, however, with an increasing number of important lessee rail-
roads in reorganization under Section 77 of the Bankruptcy Act' or in
equity, the lease began to take on greater significance. As a consequence,
today many lessees in financial difficulties are realizing that the far-
reaching changes which have occurred in transportation may turn the
long term lease into a snare and a delusion. Others, still solvent, are
exercising greater care in making new leases, and seeking ways and means
to modify existing ones. At the same time, holders of securities of lessor
companies in many instances are experiencing the acute distress attendant
upon the discovery that their securities, hitherto regarded as "gilt-edged,"
may be worth little more than the paper upon which they are printed.
The extent to which the interests of investors and of the public gener-
ally, including shippers and employees, are concerned with railroad leases
is readily demonstrable by a few statistical comparisons. At the close
of 1937, the latest date for which accurate figures are available, some
60 of the nation's 136 Class I railroads were lessees under 302 railroad
leases.2 Over twelve percent of a total exceeding 235,000 miles of road
t Assistant Dean, Yale Law School; Member of New York Bar.
t Member of New York Bar.
1. Section 77 of the Bankruptcy Act, enacted in 1933, provided for reorganization
of railroads engaged in interstate commerce. 47 STAT. 1474 (1933), amended, 49 STAT.
911 (1935), 49 STAT. 1969 (1936), 11 U.S.C. § 205 (Supp. 1938). Reorganization of
corporations other than railroads engaged in interstate commerce was originally provided
for in 1934 in Section 77B, 48 STAT. 912 (1934), 49 STAT. 664 (1935), 49 STAT. 965
(1935), 11 U.S.C. §207 (Supp. 1938), which was replaced in 1938 by Chapter X
of the Bankruptcy Act, 52 STAT. 883 (1938), 11 U. S. C. § 501 (Supp. 1938). Section 77,
however, was left unchanged in the general overhauling of the Bankruptcy Act in 1938.
2. Class I railroads are operating railroad companies having annual revenues above
$1,000,000. These statistics were derived from STA~is~ics oF RAILWAYS 1IN TIlE UNITED
STATEs (1937), prepared by the Bureau of Statistics of the Interstate Commerce Com-
mission, particularly §§ B-I and C. Since December 31, 1937, the total number of lessors
has been decreased to some extent by consolidations.
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operated by Class I lines was operated subject to lease?3 Approximately
fourteen percent of a total unmatured funded debt of almost twelve
billion dollars of Class I roads and their lessors constitute obligations
of lessors upon which, in one way or another, their lessees are obligated
to pay interest.4 In addition, about fifteen percent of a total par value
of over nine and one half billion dollars of stocks of Class I lines and
their lessors represent stocks of lessors, for the dividends upon which
their lessees are similarly obligated.' Plainly the stake in leased lines
is a considerable one.
The purpose of this Article is to present a comprehensive picture of
the railroad lease device from its origin to its present-day status in bank-
ruptcy and equity reorganizations. To do this it has been necessary to
divide the Article into two parts. Part II will appear in a subsequent
issue. In Part I, the development of the lease device and the typical
lease are first described. Then, before considering the impact of a reor-
ganization upon the leased line, the methods used in reorganization pro-
ceedings to determine the value of a leased line to its lessee are dis-
cussed in detail. Finally, against this background, the progress of a
leased line through the reorganization process is traced, commencing with
the questions of adoption and rejection of executory leases. Part I
then concludes with a discussion of who will operate the leased line
during the period in which the lessee is being reorganized.
THE ORIGIN AND DEVELOPMENT OF THE LEASE DEVICE
Even prior to the Civil War the lease device had begun to play a
prominent part in the development of American railway systems, princi-
pally by facilitating the combination of one road with another. This
importance continued undiminished through subsequent years, particu-
larly in the case of the eastern railroads. In the 1830s and 1840s,
American railroads were primarily local affairs, financed by local capital
and ordinarily operating lines in relatively restricted territories. As one
company completed its road and connected with that of another, the
advisability of combining them for operating purposes into a single
3. This percentage was calculated from statistics in id., Statement No. 3.
4. This percentage was calculated from the items appearing in id., Statement No.
54F.
5. Ibid.
6. In Part II, other matters affecting the leased line in reorganization wilt h
considered, attention being centered mainly on three problems. First, if, in answer to
the question with which Part I doses, the trustees of the lessee operate the leased line,
how will such operation be accounted for? Second, what claims will the lessor have
against the lessee or the lessee's trustees in the reorganization? Finally, what legal
alternatives exist with respect to treatment of the lessor and its security holders in the
reorganization? Other problems incidental to these three principal ones will, of course,
be discussed.
1940]
HeinOnline  -- 49 Yale L. J. 627 1939-1940
THE YALE LAW JOURNAL
railroad was readily seen. Yet there were practical obstacles to be over-
come in carrying out such combinations. For one company to buy the
assets or stock of a second company required raising additional capital
and at that time great pools of savings were not available. Moreover,
the owners of the second company usually wished to retain their invest-
ment in their railroad as such. Consequently, some means of combina-
tion was necessary which took into account both of these considerations.
Various methods were evolved, two of which deserve specific mention. 7
One was the creation of the procedure of merger or consolidation as
part of the general or special railroad statutes of the individual states;
the other, which generally also came to be regulated by state statutes, was
the lease device, borrowed from real property law. Both methods were
frequently used prior to 1860.8 Thereafter came a period of great rail-
way expansion during which the lease came into even more extensive
use, and from the close of the Civil War to the present time there has
been hardly a year in which at least one railroad lease has not been
executed.9 From time to time there have been periods of unusual lease-
making activity, usually brought about by the development of particular
railway systems or by realignments within existing systems."
The reasons why seventy or eighty years ago the lease device was
preferred in a given situation to outright merger or consolidation are
not always clear. Certain general advantages of the lease, however, can
be readily understood. From the point of view of the lessee, lease pro-
7. Other methods for combination include the direct purchase of assets of another
railroad, the acquisition of control of another road through the purchase of its shares,
agreements for joint operation and operating contracts. The last named functionally
appears to be but little different from a short term lease. These methods are described
in CLEVELAND AND POWELL, RAILROAD FNANCE (1912) c. XV. An interesting tabulation
of the forms of combination employed in the development of the New England railroad
systems between 1840 and 1900 is set forth in BAxFa, FORMATION OF THE NEW ENGLAND
RAILWAY SYsEas (1937) 256. This latter work is an invaluable historical commentary.
8. Probably the best known example of the former was the consolidation of the
various railroads operating between Albany and Buffalo into the New York Central in
1853. See HUNGERFORD, MEN AND IRON, THE HISTORY OF THE NEw YOiK CENTRAL
(1938) cc. 4, 5 and 6. With other railroads the lease also found favor. The Erie in
1852 leased the lines of the Paterson & Hudson River Railroad and the Paterson & Ra-
mapo River Railroad; the Lackawanna in 1855 leased the Cayuga & Susquehanna Rail-
road and in 1857 the Warren Railroad.
9. Through 1937 there were only six years in which a lease still in existence was
not executed. Approval of leases by the ICC was first required by the Transportation
Act of 1920. 41 STAT. 481 (1920), 49 U. S. C. § 5(2) (1934).
10. Between 1868 and 1872, thirty-six leases still in existence today were executed,
the roads most active in lease-making being the Pennsylvania, the Lackawanna, the Read-
ing, the Delaware & Hudson, the Jersey Central and the Erie. Between 1887 and 1896,
fifty leases were executed, with the Reading, the Boston & Maine, the New Haven and
the Erie being most active in this respect. Between 1921 and 1930, fifty-three leases were
executed, the roads most active being the Reading, the New York Central, the Pennsyl-
vania and the Seaboard.
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cedure was simpler than that for merger or consolidation in those states
with statutes under which a lease could be entered into 'without obtaining
the consent of the lessee's shareholders.1 With the lessee's shareholders
accordingly having no vote on the question, the problem of dissenting
shareholders and their demands for appraisal was absent.' In addition,
although a lease increased the lessee's fixed charges, the rental being
treated as part thereof, nevertheless, it was not regarded as increasing
the lessee's outstanding indebtedness. Even where the lessee promised
to discharge the lessor's obligations at maturity, these obligations did not
appear on the lessee's balance sheet as part of its indebtedness. Further-
more, a lease obviated any increase in the lessee's capital stock, thereby
avoiding any statutory limits on the total amount of its capital stock and
the necessity of obtaining the consent of its shareholders to the increase.
Thus, in given cases, the lease device offered more attractions to the
lessee than did statutory merger or consolidation. 13
From the lessor's point of view, the considerations giving rise to a
preference for the lease method might be termed psychological rather
than procedural. In almost all states the consent of the lessor's share-
holders to the making of the lease had to be obtained, just as in a merger
or consolidation.' 4 Furthermore, in a few states dissenting shareholders
were even given a right to an appraisal."D But offsetting this apparent
lack of procedural advantages was the fact that by using the lease device
the lessor's shareholders could retain their own shares of stock, often
a relatively seasoned security; and not only did not have to exchange
those shares for shares of a newer and larger enterprise as in merger
11. Today general railroad statutes in 22 states provide for consent of the lessees as
well as the lessor's shareholders. In five states such statutes specify that only the consent
of the lessor's shareholders is necessary. In the remaining states there are no provisions
requiring consent of shareholders apart from the general corporation statutes.
12. Only four state statutes give dissenting shareholders of the lessee a right to an
appraisal. MD. ANN. CODE (Bagby, 1924) art. 23, § 219; N. H. Pun. LAw (1926) c. 246,
§25; N. Y. IL 1. LAW, §261; Omo Gm. CODE Axn. (Page, 1938) §8310.
13. See generally CLEVELAND AND PowELL, op. cit. supra note 7, at C. XV; BA=n-,
op. cit. supra note 7, at c. XI.
14. General railroad statutes in twenty-eight states require the approval of varying
percentages of the lessor's shareholders for the execution of a lease. In five additional
states which have no separate railroad statutes, such approval may be necessary under
the general corporation statutes.
15. General railroad statutes in seven states definitely provide for appraisal of the
shares of a dissenting shareholder in the lessor. Di. Ruv. CODE (1935) §2178; Iin.
STAT. ANrw (Bums, 1933) § 55-2515; 'Alp. ANN. CODE (Bagby, 1924) art. 23, §219;
N. H. Pun. LAw (1926) c. 246, §25; N. J. REv. STAT. (1937) tit. 48, c. 12, §132; N. Y.
R. P. LAw, § 161; OHio GN. CoDE Axm. (Page, 1937) §§ 8810-8312. In other states,
including Connecticut, Idaho, Illinois, Missouri, Montana and Virginia, there are provi-
sions in the railroad statutes which might be construed to give a dissenter the right to
an appraisal. In some instances where a railroad was organized under a special act, the
act would provide for dissenting shareholders, sometimes those of the lessee as wrell as of
the lessor. Boston & M. R R. v. Graham, 179 Mass. 62, 60 N. E. 405 (1901).
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or consolidation, but in addition received dividends on their shares and
interest on their bonds, if any, out of the earnings of the lessee as part
of its fixed charges. In many instances, during the first years after
the execution of a lease the lessor's shareholders probably continued to
regard themselves as shareholders in a small local enterprise. And indeed,
in some instances it would appear that they fully anticipated resumption
of operation of their own line if the lease did not work out as planned."0
Nevertheless, in practical effect if not in terminology, if the lease was
fully performed by the lessee they had established themselves as creditors
of the lessee in an annual amount equal to the rental under the lease."
Two slightly different functions of the lease device should be noted.
One occurred mainly in the period immediately following the Civil War
and the other has appeared more recently in situations involving a parent-
subsidiary relationship between the lessee and lessor. The first case was
the use of the lease device to facilitate the financing of extensions to and
branches of existing roads. The existing company would cause a new
corporation to be formed which would immediately lease its projected
line to the existing road, the lease to become effective upon completion
of construction of the extension or branch. Shares of the new lessor,
and sometimes bonds secured by a first lien attaching to the new line
as built, would then be sold either to the public or to the lessee (which
could then pledge them) to raise the necessary funds for the construction
of the proposed lines. The sale of these securities, which for all practical
purposes were guaranteed by the lessee's obligation to pay rent, was
accomplished much more easily than if the new lessor had been a distinct
and separate enterprise, for their purchasers knew that payment of divi-
dends would commence when promised, regardless of the results of the
operation of the new road. This method had the added advantage of
keeping the leased line free from the liens of the lessee's mortgages, thus
rendering less difficult both initial and future financing by the lessee of
the particular line subject to the lease. 8 This latter reason is doubtless
16. See BAER, op. cit. supra note 7, at 257. That lessors before and immediately
after the Civil War may have contemplated resuming operation of their own lines is
borne out by the fact that leases in some cases were entered into for only ten or thirty
years. Upon expiration of such short terms, usually new leases for 99 or 999 years were
executed. Occasionally a lessor actually did resume operation of its line. See State v.
New Haven & Northampton Co., 37 Conn. 153 (1870).
17. In rare instances the lease method was combined with the exchange features of
merger or consolidation by offering shares of the lessee in exchange for those of the
lessor. See BAYER, op. cit. sitpra note 7, at 68; lease of Old Colony R. R. to the New
Haven (1893).
18. Instances of such leases are to be found in the cases of Southern Ry. v. Franklin
& P. R. R., 96 Va. 693, 32 S. E. 485 (1899) (lease executed in 1878); Louisville & N.
P_ R. v. Schmidt, 112 Ky. 717, 66 S. W. 629 (1902) (lease executed in 1879), and in the
lease of the Lehigh Valley Ry. to the Lehigh Valley R. R., April 14, 1891. See also
Durfee v. Old Colony & F. B. R. R., 87 Mass. 230 (1862).
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the principal explanation of the second case - where one railroad owning
the entire stock of another, which has been operating independently,
brings it into the parent's system by means of a lease rather than by
merger or consolidation. In a particular case it may be considerably
more advantageous to preserve the possibility of financing payment of
maturing bonds of the lessor by means of a new mortgage on the leased
line than to rely for that purpose upon the issuance of additional amounts
of the lessee's own available mortgage bonds, as would be necessary after
merger or consolidation. 9
THE TERMS OF THE TypicAL RAILROAD LEASE
The railroad lease document itself has an interesting history, especially
when considered in connection with the railroad mortgage."0 Early
leases were thin pamphlets averaging about ten to twenty printed pages
in length and only in rare instances attaining a length of even thirty
pages. The typical lease has retained this same length up to the present
day, and even its provisions have remained in form and substance largely
the same. This retention of simplicity is in striking contrast to the
evolution of the railroad mortgage which, during the same period, grew
from a relatively thin document to a bulky volume often exceeding one
hundred pages crammed with meticulously worded provisions.2 '
The typical railroad lease commences with a leasing and demising
clause similar to the granting clause in the typical railroad mortgage. By
this clause the lessor's entire railroad property, including right of way,
19. The New York Central, for example, has maintained through the lease device
the separate existence of the Cleveland, Cincinnati & St. Louis, with 2,034 miles of road,
and that of the Michigan Central, with 1,085 miles, as well as numerous companies with
smaller mileages.
20. This section is based on analysis of various leases, including those of which the
following railroads are lessees: Canadian Pacific; Chicago, Milvraukee, St. Paul & Pa-
cific; Delaware & Hudson; Erie; Lackawanna; Lehigh Valley; Maine Central; Missouri
Pacific; New Haven; Pennsylvania; Reading; Rock Island; St. Louis, Iron Mountain
& Southern; Southern Pacific; and Southern.
Limitations of space prevent any real comparison of the legal incidents of the lease
with those of the mortgage as they are affected by the reorganization process.
21. The major reason for this difference is clear. While the railroad lease today per-
forms practically the same function as the lease of eighty years ago, the essential func-
tion of the railroad mortgage has undergone substantial changes. The early mortgage
was created for the sole purpose of raising funds to build small lines of railroad; the
function of the modern mortgage, however, is principally to refund bonds secured by
prior mortgages and to finance additions and betterments necessary to a wide-flmg rail-
way system. Examples of early railroad mortgages are the Consolidated Mortgage of the
Pennsylvania Railroad Co. to Vistar Morris, Josiah Bacon and Edmund Smith (1873),
and the Mortgage of the Lehigh Valley Railroad Co. to the Fidelity Insurance, Trust
and Safe Deposit Co. (1873).
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track, equipment, tools, rolling stock and all other fixtures and non-
fixtures, is leased to the lessee. Unlike the mortgage, however, the
description of the property leased is rarely long, though in some cases
schedules have been annexed to show with greater particularity the
rolling stock and other assets which have been transferred.22 The essential
idea in most cases is that possession of everything owned by the lessor,
"lock, stock and barrel," goes over to the lessee for the terms of the lease.
The next important provision is that stating the term. This provision
affords the single striking example of change in leases over the years
since 1849, which, being the year of execution of the oldest lease now
in existence -that of the Erie and Kalamazoo Railroad to the Michigan
Southern Railroad Company 28 - is a convenient starting point in a
study of existing leases.24 The great majority of existing leases can
be classified, according to their terms of years, into three types: (1)
the perpetual lease, including all those with terms of 999 years; (2) the
99 year lease; and (3) the short term lease, including all those for ten
years or less and leases terminable upon short notice by either party."6
The following tabulation of these types of existing leases by the decades
in which they were executed shows the gradual tendency away from the
perpetual lease to the short term lease.2"
22. See lease of Rensselaer & Saratoga R. R. to the Delaware & Hudson (1871).
23. The New York Central assumed the lease of the Erie & Kalamazoo in 1914. It
is an interesting commentary on the lease situation that the Erie & Kalamazoo has no
de lure existence today, its charter having been forfeited in 1903. Since then it has been
recognized as a de facto corporation, both in Illinois and Michigan.
24. Other leases were, of course, executed prior to 1849, but they have either ex-
pired by their own terms and new leases been entered into, or have been terminated by
the absorption of the lessor company by the lessee, usually by the process of merger or
consolidation, following the gradual acquisition by the lessee of most of the lessor's cap-
ital stock. In 1840 the Eastern Railroad of Massachusetts leased the Eastern Railroad of
New Hampshire for 99 years. Subsequently both became part of the Boston & Maine. In
1843 the Housatonic Railroad leased the Berkshire Railroad, and later both became part
of the New Haven system. See BAKER, op. cit. supra note 7, at 73, n. 2, 147, n. 4.
25. For the purposes of classification, all leases of 900 years or more were classified
as perpetual leases; all those of approximately 99 years were classified as 99 years. In
addition to the three general classifications, there are certain leases for nondescript terms.
Six leases are in existence with terms substantially in excess of 99 years but not sufficient-
ly long to be ranked with perpetual leases. Likewise, there are 33 leases in existence
with terms in excess of 10 years but less than 90 years. Finally, there are 10 leases for
the term of the lessor's corporate existence.
26. Of course, this tabulation is to a certain degree deceptive. As pointed out in
note 16 supra, before and immediately following the Civil War there were leases executed
for terms of ten to thirty years. These leases upon their expiration were replaced by long
term leases. In a study of this nature it was not practicable to ascertain how many of
such leases there were. In any event, those leases, being for ten to thirty years, are
distinguishable from the modern short term lease, which is much more subject to ter-
mination.
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Perpetual 99 Year Short Term
Leases Leases Leases
1851-1860 9 0 0
1861-1870 25 4 0
1871-1880 16 5 1
1881-1890 19 10 1
1891-1900 19 19 1
1901-1910 11 7 3
1911-1920 8 7 2
1921-1930 10 11 19
1931-1939 1 3 8
Indeed, since 1921 the short term lease, usually terminable on thirty or
sixty days' notice by either party, has become the most usual type. Today
the execution of a lease for even 99 years is a rarity and the expectation
that all future leases will tend toward the short term lease terminable
on brief notice appears to be warranted.27
Following the leasing and demising clause and the statement of the
term come the executory covenants, some by the lessor and others by
the lessee. Those of the lessor, except for its covenant to issue its
securities to finance additions and betterments made by the lessee to the
leased line, are ordinarily formal covenants designed to assure the lessee
the full benefits of the leaseY8  These covenants are of little practical
significance so far as the present discussion is concerned. The principal
covenants by the lessee, however, are of greater consequence.
The first of the lessee's covenants is its promise to pay the lessor for
the use of the latter's railroad. This payment may be expressly desig-
nated as "rent," but just as frequently that specific word will not be
found. The payment may be specified either as a fixed sum,- ' or as an
27. The long term lease appears to be too inflexible for modern conditions, especially
from the lessee's point of view, which is mainly one of reluctance to commit itself over
a long period in view of the uncertainty as to the future of the railroad industry. With
rapidly changing circumstances a short term lease, terminable upon short notice, gives
the lessee an opportunity to rid itself of a burdensome lease apart from reorganization.
On the other hand, such a lease places the lessor somewhat at a disadvantage, for even
though the short term lease is also terminable at the lessor's option, the lihelihood of its
ever exercising the option is extremely remote. It is interesting to note that in 1893
Massachusetts provided that no future leases should be for terms longer than 99 years
unless special permission of the legislature was obtained. Msss. LAws A:.;:. (1935)
c. 260, § 63.
28. The typical lease contains a covenant by the lessor to maintain its corporate
existence during the term of the lease, a covenant that the lessee shall have exclusive
possession and control of the leased railroad, and a covenant that every corporate power
necessary to fulfill the purpose of the lease will be exercised. All such covenants are
standard in railroad leases, but rarely give rise to any dispute.
29. E-xamples of this are the lease of the Dexter & Newport Railroad to the Maine
Central (1888), and the lease between the President and Managers of the Schuylkill
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amount equal to the sum of the interest on the lessor's bonds, if it has
any outstanding, of a fixed dividend on the lessor's capital stock, of the
rent on any lines of which the lessor may be the lessee, and of a small
fixed amount for the expenses of maintaining the lessor's organization."
The lessee's promise may be to pay the bond interest directly to the
lessor's bondholders and the dividends directly to the lessor's share-
holders, and it may even be endorsed as a guaranty on the face of the
bonds and shares.3 '
Next, there usually follows a covenant by the lessee to pay taxes, which
really is part of its obligation to pay for the use of the leased line. These
clauses vary considerably, but generally include at least a promise to pay
all taxes assessed on the property of the lessor, and in addition, quite
frequently a promise to pay all taxes imposed on the lessor's capital stock,
on the lessor's franchise, or on the income or receipts from the lessor's
property. With the increasing number of different types of state and
federal taxes, situations have frequently arisen which were not con-
templated at the time of execution of the lease, and as a consequence
the proper construction of such tax covenants has often been before the
courts.
32
A third covenant of the lessee is its promise to maintain the lessor's
property. While language of particular leases varies widely, "in good
order and repair" is fairly typical. All such maintenance is usually made
an expense to be borne by the lessee. Closely tied in with this covenant
is the question of who shall bear the cost of additions an d betterments
on the leased line. Sometimes the lessee also assumes this cost,"' but
more often some provision, in the form of the covenant of the lessor
Valley Navigation & Railroad Co. and the Philadelphia & Reading Railroad Co. (1861).
The amount of the agreed rental, in whatever manner paid, in some states would be af-
fected by applicable statutes. For instance, an Ohio statute enacted in 1873 provided
that as to domestic leased lines, the rental reserved should "be at least equal to the net
earnings of such leased road for the fiscal year next preceding the one in which said
lease is made." OHIo GEN. CODE (Page, 1938) § 8813.
30. A lease of this kind is that of the West Jersey and Seashore Railroad to the
Pennsylvania (1930).
31. Covenants by the lessee to pay the rent directly to the lessor's shareholders and
bondholders occur in the leases of the Warren Railroad to the Lackawanna (1857), and
the Georgia Midland Railway Co. to the Southern Railway (1896). An example of a
"stamped" guaranty is to be found in the lease of the Northern Railroad Co. of New
Jersey to the Erie (1899). In financial circles stocks of railroad lessors are commonly
referred to as "guaranteed" whether or not a guaranty is stamped on the face of the
shares.
32. As taxes increase, a lessor whose lease does not provide for payment of taxes
by the lessee will often find that a flat payment originally more than adequate to pay the
taxes assessed against the lessor will today be almost entirely used for that purpose,
33. This is true of the lease of the Rensselaer & Saratoga R. R. to the Delaware
& Hudson (1871) (cost assumed in part only); lease of the Catawissa Railroad to the
Philadelphia & Reading R. R. (1896).
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referred to above, is made either for the direct financing of such addi-
tions and betterments by the issuance of further amounts of the lessor's
stocks and bonds at the lessee's request, or for the reimbursement of the
lessee for additions and betterments previously made by the issuance
of such securities to the lessee, to be resold or not as conditions may
warrant.34  Similar to the foregoing situation is that arising from the
necessity of providing for the payment of lessor's bonds outstanding at
the date of the lease as they subsequently mature. In a few leases the
lessee simply agrees to pay the principal of such bonds when they mature,"
but more frequently the lessor covenants to issue new bonds to refund
the maturing issue.36
In the main, the foregoing are the significant covenants in the typical
lease, and, as will be seen later, they play a significant part if the lessee
should eventually be forced to seek reorganization. There have not been
mentioned, of course, certain standard covenants found in almost all
leases, or certain unusual covenants found only in particular leases.3T
One important provision remains for discussion. In nearly every rail-
road lease there is a clause providing that upon failure to pay rent or
upon breach of other covenants by the lessee, the lessor may reenter its
property and declare the lease forfeited. This clause was included to
avoid the common law rule which permitted a lessee to remain in pos-
session of the leased line for the balance of the term despite its failure
34. For example, the lease of the Pittsburgh, Fort Wayne & Chicago Railvay to
the Pennsylvania (1869) ; lease of the Montreal and Atlantic RPailway Co. to the Can-
dian Pacific (1931).
35. The lease between the Warren Railroad Co. and the Lacmianna (1857) pro-
vides that upon maturity of the lessor's bonds, the lessee should "purchase and take an
assignment" of such bonds, which it then might hold as valid obligations of the lessor,
even though matured.
36. For example, the lease between The United Canal and Railroad Companies of
N. J. and the Pennsylvania (1871) provides that upon maturity of the various obligations
of the lessors, they will deliver to the lessee a corresponding amount of their bonds,
which the lessee may use to extinguish the maturing obligations. It is also provided that
"If the avails of the bonds * * * shall be greater than their par value, the excess shall
inure to the benefit of the lessee; but if they shall be insufficient for the purpose the
deficiency shall be made good by the lessee."
37. Another standard covenant of the lessee is its promise to discharge the duties
imposed by law upon the lessor, such as its duty as a common carrier. 'More unusual
covenants are those permitting the lessee to abandon operation of portions of the leased
line which become unprofitable [lease of East Pennsylvania RL R. to Philadelphia &
Reading R. R. (1869)]; covenants by the lessee to make annual payments into a sining
fund for the benefit of the lessor's security holders [lease of United Canal & R. R. Cos. of
N. J. to Pennsylvania R. R. (1871)]; covenants for arbitration of disputes over the
proper construction of the lease and even as to the amount of the rental payments in the
event of changing conditions [lease betveen Central P. R. RL and Southern Pacific Co.
(1885)] ; and covenants by the lessee to supply the lessor's officers with free passes over
the railroad for the duration of the lease [lease between Philadelphia, G. & N. L R.
and Philadelphia & Reading R. R. (1870)].
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to pay rent, the lessor's only remedy being an action for the unpaid rent
as it became due.3 Usually, the lease requires continuance of the breach
for some period of time, such as thirty, sixty or ninety days, before the
lessor may declare the lease forfeited and become entitled to reenter.
But while this reentry clause was intended to enable the lessor to recover
its property, to take advantage of it would ordinarily mean that the
lessor would lose its bargain with respect to rent for the balance of the
lease term. Under the common law doctrine, in force in a majority of
jurisdictions, upon reentry the lease became non-existent and the lessee
had no further obligation to pay rent. Consequently, if the lessor re-
entered, the rent for the balance of the lease would be lost, though it
might have hundreds of years yet to run. 9 Naturally clauses were
devised to meet this common law rule. In the case of the ordinary real
property lease many different forms of covenants were designed, with
more or less success, to protect the lessor more adequately."0 But in the
railroad lease no such development has taken place beyond a simple clause
to the effect that termination and reentry by the lessor is to be without
prejudice to its right to sue for damages for breach of the terms of the
lease.4
POSITION OF THE LESSOR DURING THE TERM OF THE LEASE
Once a lease has been executed and all its incidents carried out, the
lessor ceases to be an operating railroad. In most instances the ultimate
effect is that the lessor goes out of the railroad business, not just tem-
porarily, but for all time; where the lessor is also a subsidiary of the
lessee, it ceases activity well-nigh completely. Only in the case of leases
for a very short term, which constitute less than one-third of those
existing, is it likely that the lessor contemplates ever reentering the
railroad business. 2
38. See generally BENNETT, LANDLORD AND TENANT (1939) 84, 85; GERDES, Cop-
PORATE REORGANIZATION (1936) §§ 683-686 inclusive. In some states this is specifically
provided for by statute. For example, Orno GEN. CODE ANN. (Page, 1938) § 8813.
39. GERDES, op. cit. supra note 38, at §§ 684, 685; FINLETTER, PRINCIPLES OF CORPOR-
ATE REORGANIZATION (1937) 271, 272; Clark, Foley and Shaw, Adoption and Rejection
of Contracts and Leases by Receivers (1933) 46 -ARv. L. REv. 1111, 1118; Douglas and
Frank, Landlords' Claims in Reorganization (1933) 42 YALE L. J. 1003, 1006; Schwa-
bacher and Weinstein, Rent Claims in Bankruptcy (1933) 33 COL. L. REv. 213.
40. Covenants of this type are discussed in GERDES, op. cit. supra note 38, at § 686.
See also William Filene's Sons Co. v. Weed, 245 U. S. 597 (1918).
41. See lease of Pennsylvania, 0. & D. R. R. to Pennsylvania R. R. (1926). Arti-
cle Twelfth provides in part: "It is further declared and agreed that such re-entry shall
not waive or prejudice any claim or right of the Lessor to or for damages against the
Lessee on account of such non-payment of rent or non-performance or breach of the
terms of this lease, and all such claims and rights are expressly preserved to said Lessor."
42. Even as to such leases, it is probable that many of the lessors were wholly un-
able to resume railroad operations at the end of an earlier lease and had to accept a
short term lease as the only course open.
(Vol. 49 : 626636
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As we have seen, in the typical case the lessee takes over almost every-
thing the lessor owns at the date of the lease, in some instances even
investments in securities in other corporations. 3 Revenues and expenses
of operation of the leased line are indistinguishably mingled with those
of the remainder of the lessee's system, and except where, for example,
a lease provides for rental payments in terms of revenues of the leased
line, no attempt is likely to be made to ascertain whether the leased line
actually earns its rental or not. The lessee's operating department may,
and often does, have some idea whether a particular line is valuable to
the system or not, but no doubt there have been instances where upon
a segregation of system earnings, railroad officials have been surprised
to learn what a leased line has been earning as part of the system. From
the lessee's, as well as the lessor's, point of view, the whole atmosphere
becomes a system atmosphere and the underlying legal situation of sep-
arate and distinct entities is likely to be almost forgotten.
The lessor company, of course, maintains its corporate existence and
office as it has covenanted to do in the lease."4 Though great variations
exist between different lessors, particularly between those which are
subsidiaries of lessees and those which are independent, generally a typical
lessor's board of directors and officers have little to do. The board of
directors ordinarily meets at least once a year and authorizes the issuance
of an annual report." At such meetings it may receive reports from
its officers on the operation by the lessee of the lessor's line. From time
to time it must declare and authorize the payment of dividends.4" Nor
are the duties of the officers numerous. Where the lessee has majority
control, the necessary matters may be attended to as part time work
by an officer of the lessee, and even where the lessor is independent, it
is unlikely that a full-time officer will be required. Though the rent is
paid by the lessee directly to the lessor's security holders, lists of share-
holders and registered bondholders must still be kept. Other matters
which may require attention include joining in all dispositions of real
property and all acquisitions of new real estate, and in general doing
43. An example of this is the lease between the East Pennsylvania R. R. and the
Philadelphia & Reading R. R. (1869).
44. The office itself will probably be two or three rooms in some office building, and
where the lessor is controlled by the lessee through stock ownership, it may be nothing
more than a single room or a desk in the general office or a regional office of the lessee.
For example, of the thirty-six lessor companies which executed leases between 1853 and
1872 inclusive, sixteen have their offices in the general office of the lessee, while of fifty-
three leases in the decade of 1921 to 1930, forty lessors have no offices separate from those
of their lessees.
45. Boards of some lessors meet more often. For example, that of the United Xew
Jersey Railroad & Canal Co. meets quarterly.
46. Certainly the declaration of dividends by formal act of the board of directors is
necessary where the rent is paid to the lessor and then distributed to its shareholders.
1940]
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all other acts essential to afford the lessee the full benefits of the lease. 
4
Occasionally a lessor will retain some assets such as securities of other
companies, and in such a case the officer or officers may have to give
attention to his portfolio.4
8
From this short description it can be seen that an ordinary lessor
company, during the term of the lease, may have become ill-prepared to
deal with problems which arise if its lessee encounters financial dificul-
ties. From the standpoint of personnel alone, there may be no one con-
nected with the lessor company capable of taking the initiative on its
behalf. The lessor's treasury ordinarily will be bare of funds with which
action may be financed.40 Consequently, in the case of the typical lessor,
it is probable that if any action is to be taken it will have to be directly
by the lessor's security holders or their representatives on their own
behalf.
THE LESSOR AND REORGANIZATION OF THE LESSEE
The tranquil existence of many lessor companies and their security
holders ended abruptly in the depression years after 1929. 0 As railroads
47. For example, condemnations may have to be conducted in the lessor's name and the
lessor may have to be a party to contracts with reference to public and private crossings.
48. Thus, the balance sheet of the Boston & Albany, a large independently controlled
lessor, as of December 31, 1938, carried under "Investments" the figure of $6,394,611 ; the
balance sheet of The Rensselaer and Saratoga R. R. Co., a small independent lessor, on
the same date showed under "Other Investments" the figure of $130,070.
49. This is particularly true where the interest and dividends on the lessor's securi-
ties are paid directly by the lessee, for then the lessor will generally have no income what-
ever aside from the small amount received to maintain its corporate status. Where the
lessor receives the rental payment itself and disburses interest and dividends to its se-
curity holders, its position may be somewhat improved because it may be possible at least
to withhold dividend payments. However, further factors may be present as, for example,
where taxes must be paid out of the rental it is not unlikely that taxes may have in-
creased over the years to a point that little can be set aside for emergencies.
50. The discussion which follows centers around Section 77 of the Bankruptcy Act.
Dissatisfaction with the substantive principles of law affecting leased lines which had
been worked out in equity receiverships was not one of the causes motivating the enact-
ment of Section 77, nor did that statute make many changes in those principles. For the
most part, it may be assumed that comment herein regarding proceedings under Section
77 is also applicable to proceedings in equity, with due allowance for the obvious pro-
cedural differences within the framework of which the substantive principles are applied.
In addition to the cases and authorities cited, the present study is also based upon a
detailed examination of the printed court records in proceedings under Section 77 for
the reorganization of the following railroads: Chicago, G. W. R. R. (N. D. Ill.) ; Chi-
cago, M., St. P. & P. R. R. Co. (N. D. Ill.) ; Chicago & N. R. R. (N. D. Ill.) ; Chicago,
R. I. & P. Ry. (N. D. Ill.) ; Denver & R. G. W. R. R. (D. Colo.) ; Erie R. R. (N. D.
Ohio); Minneapolis, St. P. & S. S. M. Ry. (D. Minn.); New York, N. H. & H. R. R.
(D. Conn). Somewhat less detailed examination has been made in the following pending
equity receiverships: Central of Georgia Ry. (S. D. Ga).; Norfolk S. R. R. (E. D.
Va.); Seaboard A. L. R. R. (E. D. Va.). With the exception of the 'Iissouri P. R. R.
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operating part of their mileage under leases either filed petitions for re-
organization or came to the brink of filing such petitions, the interests
not only of their own security holders but also of their lessors were
necessarily affected. 1 It is not essential to this discussion to consider
the causes which, in recent years, have forced an unprecedented number
of railroads, including many lessee roads, into reorganization. Suffice it
to point out that, together with bond interest and other items, lease
rentals are an important part of the fixed charges of the typical lessee
railroad,5" and that, as in the past, burdensome lease rentals have been
among the factors combining to make reorganization necessaryPm
When a proceeding for the reorganization of a lessee railroad is com-
menced, the legal position of its lessors is immediately affected, for both
in equity and under Section 77 the lessee's receivers or trustees may elect
to adopt or reject its executory leases." Thus it becomes possible for
the lessee to be relieved of lease obligations which have become burden-
some. In the remainder of this Article we shall follow the lessor through
the lessee's reorganization proceeding, indicating problems which may
arise and condition the final treatment of the lessor upon the termination
of the proceeding. It will be seen that this depends primarily upon the
answer to the single question: what is the value of the leased line to the
lessee? Or to put it another way, is it worth the annual price called for
by the lease?
(Section 77) and the Wabash Ry. (equity), these are the principal Class I lessee rail-
roads now in process of reorganization. The proceeding for the reorganization 4~f
the Central R. R. of New Jersey, under Section 77, was only recently instituted.
51. All the reorganizations listed in note 50 supra were instituted after 1929. In ad-
dition, at least two other important Class I railroads operating part of their mileage
under lease have had financial difficulties, the Baltimore & Ohio and the Lehigh Valley.
Both these companies are working out voluntary reorganizations under the so-called
"Voluntary Adjustment Bill" [Chapter XV of Bankruptcy Act, Pub. L. No. 242, 76th
Cong., 1st Sess. (July 28, 1939)]. It should be noted that at the hearings on the bill
before the Senate Committee on Interstate Commerce, May 10-12, 1939, several pro-
posals were offered for the purpose of expressly including the power to modify leases
within the grant to the bankruptcy courts constituted under the bill. These proposals,
labeled "clarifying" amendments by their sponsors, were not adopted, and as finally enact-
ed, the bill authorized such courts to exercise "original jurisdiction, as provided in this
chapter, for postponements or modifications of debt, interest, rent, and maturities or for
modifications of the securities or capital structures of railroads." Such postponements
or modifications can take place only after obtaining the consent of the security holders
affected. No trustees are appointed under the bill as enacted and the power to elect to
adopt or reject existing leases is not granted in proceedings under it.
52. The Lackawanna is the prime example of a railroad with fixed charges made up
almost entirely of rentals under leases. In 1938 its total rentals amounted to $7,452,330,
while its interest on funded debt amounted to a relatively meagre $162,3G0.
53. See DEwIxG, THE FINANCIAL POLICY o0 ConronArozis (1934) 1215, 1216.
54. This is the only way a lessee may free itself entirely or bring about a modifica-
tion of its lease obligations without obtaining the consent of its lessors.
HeinOnline  -- 49 Yale L. J. 639 1939-1940
THE YALE LAW JOURNAL
THE DETERMINATION OF VALUE
In a complex railroad system, the formation of a judgment as to tile
value of different parts of the system separately subject to mortgage or
lease is a complicated matter of statistical and financial analysis, made
even more difficult by the interplay of factors not susceptible of expres-
sion in numerical terms2 5 In reorganization, earnings and earning power
are the primary bases upon which a new financial structure is created.
Since the parts of a system are valuable to it chiefly in terms of earnings
and earning power, various studies have been devised to measure such
earnings, each intended to disclose elements of value inherent in the line
in question. The most important of these studies is the segregation study,
intended to disclose what portion, if any, of the net income from the
operation of the system as a whole is attributable to the mortgaged or
leased line alone. In addition, there is the severance study, which attempts
to ascertain in terms of effect upon the net income of the mortgaged
or leased line, as well as the remainder of the system, the consequences
which would follow if the line in question were to be operated independ-
ently of the remainder of the system or in conjunction with another rail-
way system with which it may connect, thus becoming a competitor of
the mortgagor or lessee. Particular circumstances may furnish the
impetus for the preparation of other studies by those interested in the line
in question, as well as by the lessee's trustees." If negligible earnings,
or losses, are shown by the segregation studies, this may point the way
to detailed surveys of possible abandonments, of possible economies in
operation, and of factors influencing the available traffic in the territory
served by the line being studied.
Such a brief statement is hardly adequate to disclose the nature of
these studies. Certain of them, however, are of such importance, par-
ticularly the segregation and severance studies, as to warrant more detailed
discussion.
1. Segregation study. By segregation of income is meant the alloca-
tion of the various items of operating revenues and expenses of a rail-
road system to its different mortgaged as well as leased lines in such a
way as to show the income properly allocable to each when operated as
part of the system.57 The need for such a segregation arises out of the
55. It is not intended to convey the impression that "value" as used in the preceding
sentence is concretely definable. At the best it is possible only to indicate certain elements
which go to make up "value."
56. Among these may be an effort on the part of the former to show that a "contribu-
tion" is made to the earnings of the system by reason of traffic received from and delivered
to the line in question. This, however, is a matter closely, if not inextricably, related to
studies of severance value.
57. The operations of a railroad system are, of course, conducted for the greatest
benefit of the system as a whole, and not necessarily to secure the maximum earnings of
any particular portion of the system.
[Vol. 49: 626640
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fact that the uniform accounting rules of the Interstate Commerce
Commission do not apportion the earnings of a system among its mem-
ber parts, but reflect only the operation of a system as a whole. Since
a good part of the system revenues and expenses are generally common
to two or more of the mortgaged or leased lines, methods must be devised
for their proper division among these parts of the system. In practice
the various methods of making this allocation are combined in what is
known as a "segregation formula." Certain of the major facts about
segregation formulas should be pointed out here.
In the reorganization of railroad systems in equity receiverships, segre-
gation formulas were developed in particular cases to meet practical needs.
Under Section 77, the probability of similar needs was recognized, and
subsection (c) (10) specifically provides that the reorganization court
may direct the keeping of such records and accounts as will permit an
allocation of earnings and expenses to each of the mortgaged and leased
lines making up the debtor's system. The same subsection further pro-
vides for reference by the court to the ICC for its recommendations
as to the method or formula by which the segregation shall be made.
The usual procedure in carrying out a segregation study is first to work
out the formula and then apply it to operating revenues and expenses
for a test period. Such a test period may be of only several months'
duration, but will probably be a year or more. The actual application
of the formula is ordinarily performed by the lessee's accounting depart-
ment, and involves a detailed analysis of all items of operating revenues
and expenses for the entire system during the test period. Each item
of revenue and expense as defined in the ICC's uniform system of
accounts is either allocated directly, or in the manner prescribed in the
formula, to the particular mortgage or lease line or lines which gave
rise to it. For present purposes, the way in which this allocation is
carried out will be discussed only in terms of leased lines.
Items of revenues and expenses in connection with both passenger and
freight service which are local to a leased line can be credited or charged
directly to that line. But items which are applicable in part to a leased
line and in part to another portion of the lessee's system must be allo-
cated to each in as fair and equitable a manner as circumstances permit.
The proper division of such items between the parts of the lessee's system
is the chief concern of the formula. By and large the methods by which
this division is made are as follows:
In apportioning revenues under the formula, an attempt is usually
made to follow the methods in use between independent railroads in the
surrounding territory. Passenger revenues are divided on a strict mileage
basis, since this is the common practice between railroads. An example
of this method as employed in a system formula is as follows: if a
passenger rides one hundred miles on system lines, of which twenty-five
19401
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miles are on a leased line, one-fourth of the fare received by the system
will be allocated to the leased line. The division of freight revenues,
however, is more complicated, since rate divisions between independent
railroads are governed by considerations, such as bargaining power, the
relative weight of which it is impossible to analyze and hence to apply
in different situations. In so far as generalization is possible, it may be
said that rate divisions between railroads attempt to recognize the relative
service performed by each, the principal types of which are road haul
and terminal service, the latter comprising costs of origination, inter-
change and termination. A large part of a railroad's expenses are in-
curred in the assembly of traffic into trains and its switching to freight
houses, yards or consignees' sidings after trains have arrived at their
destinations, as distinguished from the expense of hauling it over the
road. In divisions of freight revenues between independent railroads,
this fact is recognized in various ways, sometimes by the allotment of
a flat percentage (usually in the case of short lines connecting with trunk
lines), sometimes by allotting a minimum percentage of the rate, usually
twenty-five per cent, no matter how short the haul, and sometimes by
using factors based in part upon the local rates of each carrier. A method
which has come into use more recently, especially in the East, consists
of adding "constructive" mileage to the road haul mileage of each carrier
in order to compensate the carrier for the terminal and interchange service
which it renders. Revenues are then divided in proportion to the sum
of the actual and constructive mileage on each road. As applied in segre-
gation formulas this method operates about as follows: if a carload of
iron ore is carried one hundred miles over system lines including twenty-
five miles over a leased line, and is terminated on the leased line, the
leased line receives a proportion of the system revenues from the ship-
ment in the ratio that the leased line's total of actual and constructive
mileage in connection with the shipment bears to the similar total for
the system. This method is believed by many to produce more accurate
results and to be better adapted for segregation purposes than the others
which have been mentioned. The "constructive" mileage allowance for
application in a particular case is arrived at by first determining average
terminal and road mileage costs per car, and then translating the terminal
cost into equivalent "constructive" miles. 8
Expenses in connection with both passenger and freight service which
cannot be directly allocated to a particular line are allocated to the several
lines involved on various appropriate bases, including, in the same
formula, mileage pro rates, "use factors," and other similar devices. In
58. See New York, S. & W. R. R. Reorg., Finance Docket No. 11681, Dec. 14, 1939,
with respect to the use of a constructive mileage block where a terminal mortgage
division has no line haul.
[Vol. 49: 626
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addition, most formulas attempt to provide for certain intra-system
charges and credits not normally shown in a railroad's income account,
in order to carry out fully and equitably the distribution of revenues and
expenses between the various parts of the system."o These include such
charges and credits as for handling on a leased line locomotive fuel to
be used on another part of the lessee's system, and for interest on equip-
ment and facilities owned by the lessee but used in connection with
service maintained on a leased line or vice versa. In the case of the
former, the charges and credits are computed under the formula on the
basis of the estimated cost of the movement; in the case of the latter,
charges and credits are computed as an annual percentage of the invest-
ment involved.
It can readily be seen that the development of segregation formulas
is a highly technical matter, requiring considerable statistical and engi-
neering skill. And, as might be expected, their specific provisions, as
well as the results of their application, provide opportunities for dis-
agreement over questions in which the practical aspects of railroading play
an important part. In proceedings under Section 77 where formulas
have been developed and referred to the Interstate Commerce Commis-
sion, the most significant parts of the Commission's decisions have been
those concerned with points on which disputes have developed.c It
should be kept in mind that inasmuch as the conditions surrounding the
operation of two railroad systems are never identical, a formula adapted
to one railroad system may not meet the necessities of another railroad
system in all respects. Nevertheless, within the broad outlines indicated,
segregation formulas will tend to conform.
59. These intra-system 'charges and credits are not, however, levied with the idea
that one part of the system should make a profit at the expense of any other part.
60. Among the matters in dispute have been such questions as (1) whether or not
the results obtained by apportioning passenger revenues on a straight mileage prorate
should be adjusted to reflect differences in terminal expenses; (2) whether charges for
use of facilities should be computed upon the basis of rates prevailing between independent
railroads in similar instances and for the use of equipment on the basis of the average
rate of return on the debtor's equipment trusts, or whether in both cases a different basis
should be used, as, for ex-ample, the approximate rate of return on the property investment
in the debtor's system as a whole, or whether any special return at all should be allowed.
See In re Chicago, R. I. & P. R. R., C. C. A. 7th, Dec. 12, 1939 (Court Record 2359),
holding that the measure of charges should be fixed and uniform. Other possible diffi-
culties might be whether the test periods used in preparing the formula as vell as in its
application may not give rise to unsound segregation results, as might occur, for e-an-
ple, if maintenance expenses on portions of the system have been at unusually high or
low levels. These are all matters the lessor interests must study and be prepared to deal
with at the hearings on the formula before the ICC, if not even earlier. The fact that such
difficulties may exist, however, does not necessarily prevent the development of a segrega-
tion formula and its approval by ICC which is as fair and equitable to all interests as the
circumstances of a particular case permit.
1940]
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The initiative in preparing a segregation formula has most frequently
come from the lessee's security holders or the lessee itself."' The stage
at which the lessor interests have a proper interest in the development of
a formula is not entirely clear. Since the formula is designed to serve,
among other things, as a basis for the lessee's trustees to decide whether
to elect to adopt or not to adopt a lease, it may be argued that the lessor
interests should not participate. Inasmuch as the trustees are trustees
for the lessee debtor, their interest in discovering whether a given lease
is in fact either profitable or burdensome to the estate which they are
administering would seem to be primary. From the long range point of
view, however, the fact that the lessor interests will be affected by the
results of the application of the formula gives them a clear interest.
Whether in a particular case participation from the start in the devel-
opment of the formula would benefit the lessor interests more than formal
criticism of the formula before the reorganization court and the ICC
will probably depend upon its circumstances. In any event, once the
formula is complete, the lessor interests are entitled to be heard on its
fairness both in the reorganization court, itself, and before the ICC,
either at hearings on plans or if there is a reference to that body. 2
61. The formula in the Chicago, Indianapolis & Louisville proceeding, which did not
involve any leased lines but is nonetheless relevant, was prepared by ICC Examiners
after a protective committee for bonds issued under a divisional mortgage petitioned the
court to appoint an appropriate officer of the court, such as a special master, to prepare
a formula. Finance Docket 10294, 228 I.C.C. 209 (1938). This petition, together with the
answer of the trustees, the court referred to the ICC. In the New Haven proceeding
the formula was prepared by the debtor's statistical department under the direction of the
trustees, in collaboration with railroad experts representing groups of creditors, with
whom frequent consultations were held. Finance Docket 10992, 224 I.C.C. 723 (1938).
A formula has also been recommended by the ICC for the New York, Susquehanna &
Western. Finance Docket 11681 (decided Dec. 14, 1939). In the Rock Island proceed-
ing, the formula was originally prepared by representatives of the trustees and was later
modified by committees representing issues of the Rock Island's bonds, who had em-
ployed experts for the purpose.
Among other proceedings under Section 77 in which formulas have been developed and
used, but without specific approval of the court or reference to the ICC, are the pro-
ceedings for the reorganization of the St. Louis, San Francisco (formula prepared by
the trustees' accounting officers, with frequent conferences with experts representing com-
mittees for the debtor's bonds), the Erie (formula prepared by the debtor's special plan
committee, consisting largely of operating officers of the debtor, appointed by its board
of directors), and the Chicago, Northwestern (formula prepared by the debtor's officers
in conjunction with railroad experts representing secured creditors). In at least two
pending equity receiverships formulas have been developed. (Seaboard and Central of
Georgia).
62. Reference of the formula to the ICC is discretionary with the court. If no party
requests a reference, the court may, presumably after a hearing, approve a formula with-
out one. In at least one proceeding (Rock Island, see Court Record 2859) appeals have
been taken from orders of the court interpreting certain provisions of the formula, and
generally speaking no doubt the order approving the formula in its entirety is also appeal-
[Vol. 49 : 626
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Although a determinatiQn of the income of a leased line when operated
as a part of its lessee's system is not the sole criterion of its value to
the system, in most cases it is of greatest importance in determining
the treatment in the reorganization to which the leased line is entitled.
Indeed, in cases where the segregated earnings of a leased line are ample
to pay the rental called for by the existing lease, it is usually considered
unnecessary to make other tests. In addition, and more immediately.
the results of the segregation study not only will play a most impurtant
part in determining whether the lessee's receivers or trustees should
elect to adopt or reject a lease, but will also furnish a basis for the
accounting which will take place between the lessor and the lessee's
trustees for the actual operation of the leased line by the latter if they
should elect to reject the lease.
There may, however, be elements of value inherent in a particular
leased line which, by reason of its fundamental character, a segregation
study cannot consider. To disclose these values, segregation studies are
frequently supplemented by "severance" and other studies, which usually
take the segregation results as their point of departure.
2. Severance Study. The value of a leased line to the lessee which
is shown by a severance study is the value which the leased line may
be said to have because of the consequences which would follow if it
were to be separated from the lessee's system and operated either inde-
pendently or as part of another railroad system. In such a study it is
assumed that a complete separation actually has occurred, and that the
management of the severed line is not friendly to the remainder of the
lessee's system, and will divert from it whatever traffic it can control-
but only, of course, where it can do so without loss to itself. The char-
acteristic difference between the value disclosed by a severance study and
that shown by a segregation study is that the latter consists of a deter-
mination of the income of the leased line based upun the facts of its
actual operation as part of the lessee's system, whereas the former is
an estimate of the effect upon the lessee's income of a hypothetical,
though not impossible, situation.
If a leased line should be separated from its lessee's system, and
operated independently, certain results would follow from the point of
able. A request for a reference to the ICC after approval by the court may well raise
questions of procedure. For this reason, as well as the fact that the ICC is better quali-
fied to deal with matters of such a highly technical nature (see In re Chicago Rraz:
Island, supra note 60), the safer course to be followed by parties dissatisfied with a for-
mula would seem to be to request a reference to the ICC prior to appr,:wval by the court.
Indeed, a court might well expedite the proceedings by referring the formula to the ICC
on its own motion early in the reorganization. A request for a reference normally would
be made on a petition by the trustees for approval by the court of the formula. However,
a reference to the ICC may occur at other points in the proceeding. See § 77(e) (10).
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view of the remainder of the lessee's system. It would, of course, be
freed from a substantial part, if not all, of the expenses charged to the
leased line in the segregation study. 3 On the other hand, it would lose
not only the revenues allocable to the leased line in the segregation study
but also, should the leased line be able to divert traffic0 4 away from the
lessee, the revenues which it would otherwise receive from the passage
of this traffic over its own lines.
In practice, the preparation of a severance study proceeds about as
follows, taking as an example a leased line which has segregated income.
The point of departure is the amount of this segregated income, which,
as has been seen, would be lost to the lessee. Secondly, an estimate is
made of expenses charged to the leased line in the segregation study which,
after its severance, would have to be born by the lessee. Next, in order
to take into account whatever diversion of traffic from the lessee may
be probable, still another estimate is made of the revenues which the
lessee receives from such traffic as it passes over the lessee's lines.
From this is deducted an estimate of those expenses which are charge-
able to this traffic under such circumstances but which, assuming
diversion, would not remain to be born by the lessee. The difference
between the latter two estimates is the loss sustained by the lessee from
diversion alone. Finally, by adding to this latter amount the segregated
income of the leased line and the expenses charged to it under the segre-
gation study and now to be borne by the lessee, as referred to above,
an estimate is reached of the amount which the lessee would lose should
the leased line be severed from it and operated independently."
63. Certain of these expenses, as in connection with joint facilities, presumably would
have to be born by the lessee after severance of the leased line.
64. In estimating the probable extent of diversions of traffic under such circumstances,
the judgment of the lessee's traffic officers is customarily sought, since these men are, by
their experience and training, most competent to weigh the factors involved. These fac-
tors may include such matters as the location of the leased line, the availability and rela-
tive circuity of competing routes, its connections with competing carriers and the con-
venience and efficiency of terminal facilities at common points, and many other considera-
tions which influence the movement of traffic.
65. A hypothetical illustration of this calculation would be as follows:
Segregated income of leased line ...................... $1,000,000
Expenses assigned to leased line born by lessee after
severance ........................................ 100,000
$1,100,000
Revenues lost by lessee through diversion of
traffic by severed leased line ............ $2,000,000
Expenses saved by lessee through non-carrage
of diverted traffic ...................... 800,000 1,200,000
Lessee's total loss from severance ..................... $2,300,000
If the leased line has a segregated loss, obviously its severance will result in gain to
the lessee. However, this gain will be diminished by (1) expenses previously charged to
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In addition, if the study is complete, estimates will also be made of
the revenues and expenses of the severed line after severance, in an
effort to ascertain the results of its independent operation. For it is
desirable, of course, from the standpoint of both lessor and lessee to
determine as accurately as possible not only the net effect of severance
upon the remainder of the lessee's system but also the results of separate
operation of the leased line.
Obviously, the value disclosed by a severance study is somewhat more
speculative and more a matter of opinion than the value disclosed by
a segregation study." Nevertheless, since the objective of a sever-
ance study is an effort to measure elements of value which cannot be
shown by a segregation study, it is often a necessary adjunct to a segre-
gation study upon which, as has been seen, it heavily relies. A leased
line may, under some circumstances, be more valuable to its lessee by
reason of its severance value than by reason of its segregation value.
Thus, a leased line which can obtain equal or greater benefits by deliver-
ing its traffic to other tailroads which are competitors of its lessee, and
which originates and terminates traffic from which the lessee derives
substantial direct revenues, plainly has a value to the lessee over and
above the amount of its segregated earnings.
THE POWER TO ELECT TO ADOPT OR REJECT EXECUTORY LEAsEs
With this background, let us turn now to the reorganization process
itself. It has long been established in equity receivership practice that
a receiver may elect to adopt or reject 7 executory leasesY5  Though
the leased line which, after severance, have to be born by the lessee, and (2) the loss sus-
tained by the lessee as a result of non-passage over its lines of such traffic as the leased
line may be able to divert.
Needless to say, in particular cases it may be urged that other considerations tend to
increase or decrease severance value. If in fact this is the effect of the considerations, an
attempt must be made to express them in numerical terms.
66. Closely akin to the idea of severance value is the notion that a leased line may
possess value to the lessee arising out of "contribution" of income to the lessee's system
from freight traffic originating or terminating on it.
67. The phrases "elect to adopt" and "elect not to adopt" perhaps most accurately
characterize the action which a receiver or trustee may take with respect to e-ecutory
leases. The receivership cases, however, appear to have used the words "adoption!' and
"affirmance" as synonymous on the one hand, and "rejection" and "disaffirmance" as synon-
ymous on the other. In this article the words "adopt" and "reject" and "adoption" and
"rejection" are used throughout, the latter in the sense of "election not to adopt."
6S. United States Trust Co. v. Wabash Ry., 150 U. S. 287 (1S93) ; St. Joseph, St. L
K R. v. Humphreys, 145 U. S. 105 (1892); Quincy, *M. & P. R. R. v. Humphreys, 142
U. S. 82 (1892); Sunflower Oil Co. v. Wilson, 142 U. S. 313 (1892); American Brake
Shoe & F. Co. v. New York Rys., 282 Fed. 523 (C. C. A. 2d, 1922); American Bral:e
Shoe & F. Co. v. New York Rys., 232 Fed. 293 (S. D. N.Y. 1920) ; Pennsylvania Steel
Co. v. New York C. Ry., 219 Fed. 939 (S. D. N. Y. 1914) ; Pennsylvania Steel Co. v. New
York C. Ry., 192 Fed. 135 (S. D. N. Y. 1911); Dayton Hydraulic Co. v. Felsenthal,
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authority to make such an election is not expressly conferred upon trustees
appointed under Section 77, nevertheless, in view of the clear import of
subsections (a) and (c) (2) there can be little question of its existence.
Moreover, it is implicitly recognized in subsection (b). Section 77 con-
tains no provisions which even impliedly negative it, and, without excep-
tion, present practice accepts its existence.
The early equity cases also made the period within which election may
take place subject to the test of reasonableness. Here, as in most instances,
the test is a relative one. What constitutes a reasonable time evokes
the familiar phrase that it "must be determined by all the facts and
circumstances surrounding the particular case in hand." 9 In pending
reorganizations the initial orders generally not only expressly grant the
authority, but, in addition, prescribe the period, almost invariably six
months, within which it may be exercised."0 In practice this is not a
rigid limitation, for extensions are liberally granted for further periods
of the same duration, or, occasionally, "until further order of the
Court."''1  Such extensions may, at times, place' a lessor somewhat at
a disadvantage. In cases where the orders effecting them are entered
116 Fed. 961 (C. C. A. 6th, 1902) ; Platt v. Philadelphia & R. R. R., 84 Fed. 254 (C. C.
A. 3d, 1898) ; Mercantile Trust Co. v. Farmers Loan & Trust Co., 81 Fed. 254 (C. C. A.
8th, 1897) ; Central R. R. & Banking Co. v. Farmers Loan & Trust Co., 79 Fed. 158 (S.
D. Ga. 1897); Empire Distilling Co. v. McNulta, 77 Fed. 700 (C. C. A. 7th, 1897);
Clyde v. Richmond & D. R. R., 63 Fed. 21 (1894) ; Ames v. Union P. Ry., 60 Fed. 966
(D. S. C. 1894); New York, P. & 0. R. v. New York, L. E. & W. R., 58 Fed. 268
(N. D. Ohio 1893); Farmers Loan & Trust Co. v. Northern Pac. R. R. Co., 58 Fed.
257 (E. D. Wis. 1893) ; Park v. New York, L. E. & W. R. R., 57 Fed. 709 (S. D. N. Y.
1893). See Clark, Foley and Shaw, Adoption and Rejection of Contracts and Leases by
Receivers (1933) 46 HARV. L. REV. 1111.
69. American Brake Shoe & Foundry Co. v. New York City Rys., 282 Fed. 293,
297 (S. D. N. Y. 1920); Northern Kansas City Bridge & R. R. Co. v. Leness, 83 F,
(2d) 9, 13 (C. C. A. 8th, 1936); General Finance Corp. v. New York S. Rys., 54 F.
(2d) 1008, 1009 (C. C. A. 2d, 1932) ; Westinghouse Elec. & Mfg. Co. v. Brooklyn Rapid
Transit Co., 6 F. (2d) 547, 549 (C. C. A. 2d, 1925).
70. Typical of the language employed for this purpose is that contained in Order No.
1 (Feb. 28, 1935), Court Record 5, in the Chicago, Great Western proceeding: "(4)
That the Debtor may in its discretion or at any time prior to September 1, 1935, or prior
to such other date as may be provided by further order of this Court, disaffirm any of its
existing contracts or leases." While variations in language appear in orders in other
proceedings, the effect is the same. If, as in the above excerpt, no reference is made to
trustees to be subsequently appointed, the usual provision in the order appointing trustees
is to grant such trustees "all the right, privileges, powers and duties" previously granted
to the debtor. Present practice in equity receiverships sanctions an express grant to the
receiver of authority to elect to adopt or reject, the language used being substantially the
same as in proceedings under Section 77. Cf. Clark, Foley and Shaw, supra note 39, at
1122.
71. Rock Island Proceeding, Order No. 71 (May 1, 1935), Court Record 806. Such
extensions are generally granted upon petition of the debtor's trustees, and in practice,
through successive orders, preserve the authority to elect to adopt or reject throughout
the proceeding, in the absence of objection by the lessor interests.
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exr parte, any determination of whether or not a reasonable time has
elapsed must be instituted, presumably by subsequent separate motion,
by the lessor, which will have the burden of proving that the extension
is unreasonable.12 Normally it would seem to be to the advantage of
the lessor interests to take the initiative, either in seeking to force election
or in obtaining payments under lease. However, even such action by
the lessor interests may be of only temporary value, because of the possi-
bility that rejection may take place in the plan of reorganization, regard-
less of prior adoption.3
The problem of whether a particular lease should be adopted or rejected
is a matter of business judgment. 4 For the first of many times during
the reorganization proceeding the value of the leased line to the lessee's
system becomes the significant consideration. However, so far as election
is concerned, the determination of value does not involve at this point
in the proceeding an effort to arrive at the true value of the leased line
to the lessee. It merely involves answering the question whether the
leased line is worth the annual price called for by the lease. This dis-
tinction is important, for while the trustees may need detailed informa-
tion to decide whether a particular leased lini, whos.e lease calls for
an annual rental of say $300,000. warrants the payment of precisely
$200,000, $150,000, $100,000 or no price whatever, they may need no
such detailed information to decide that the payment of $300,000
annually is not warranted. In other words they may be able to tell that
the leased line is not worth to the lessee the rental called for by the
existing lease, though they are as yet unable to tell exactly what the
rental, if any, should be. So at an early stage in the reorganization pro-
ceeding the trustees may be able to advise the court that one lease should
be rejected, even though at the same stage they are not in a position
to advise the court that certain other leases should be adopted., As a
practical matter, this would seem to mean that adoption may not occur,
while rejection may occur, early in the reorganization.
However, even though the trustees do recommend rejection at an early
stage in the proceeding, the various studies previously described will
presumably have been commenced, and some results may be available to
guide the trustees. In every instance the trustees will have such informa-
tion as is known to the lessee's operating staff. While this latter may
72. For example of the typical motion and order extending the time to disaffirm, see
Missouri Pacific Proceeding, Motion and Order Nos. 8KI (Sept. 27, 1933), Court Record
531, 535. On the other hand all parties, including the lessor, may agree to an indefinite
extension.
73. See p. 651 infra.
74. See MNercantile Trust Co. v. Farmers Loan & Trust Co., 81 Fed. 254, 259 (C. C.
A. 8th, 1897).
75. On the other hand, the trustees may merely petition for instructions as to how to
deal with the lease, presenting the relevant facts to the court at hearing.
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not be as comprehensive as desirable, nevertheless it is apt to be of
considerable aid in deciding whether benefits accruing to the lessee from
the leased line warrant payment of the rental called for by the lease.
THE MANNER OF ELECTION
In contrast with the importance of its effect upon existing legal rela-
tionships, the formal act of election is very simple, consisting generally
of the lessee's trustees' sending by registered mail to the particular lessor
a notice stating that pursuant to authority granted by the court, the
trustees adopt or reject the lease.7" After mailing such a notice it has
been customary in cases pending under Section 77 for the trustees to
file with the reorganization court a report stating that the notice has been
mailed to the lessor.
Although this represents the "formal" manner of election, receivers
and trustees must be careful in their actions prior to taking such a step.
Courts of equity have, in several instances, held receivers to have adopted
existing leases by actions of an informal nature." Moreover, it is clear
76. In Section 77 proceedipgs, the orders authorizing the trustees to reject usually
state specifically the manner of rejection. Although these orders may expressly authorize
only rejection, the corresponding authority to adopt would seem to be implied, and in
such cases the manner of adoption would presumably be the same as the manner of rejec-
tion expressly indicated. For example, in the Denver & Rio Grande Western Proceeding,
Order No. 1 (Nov. 1, 1935), Court Record 8, provides: "Such disaffirmance shall
be indicated by notice, in writing, to that effect, served on the other party or parties to
such contract, and filed herein." Orders in other proceedings generally have expressly
stated that the notice may be mailed to the lessor, requiring only proof of mailing. For
example, Chicago & Northwestern Proceeding, Order No. 1 (June 28, 1935), Court
Record 9.
77. Gaston v. Rutland R. R., 35 F. (2d) 685 (C. C. A. 2d, 1929); Peabody Coal Co.
v. Nixon, 226 Fed. 20 (C. C. A. 8th, 1915); Platt v. Philadelphia & R. R. R., 84 Fed. 535
(C. C. A. 3d, 1898) ; Central Trust Co. v. Continental Trust Co., 86 Fed. 517 (C. C. A.
8th, 1898); Carswell v. Farmers Loan & Trust Co., 74 Fed. 88 (C. C. A. 6th, 1896);
In re Mallow Hotel Corp., 17 F. Supp. 872 (E. D. Pa. 1937); Menke v. Willcox, 275
Fed. 57 (S. D. N. Y. 1915); Pennsylvania Steel Co. v. New York City Ry., 192 Fed.
135 (S. D. N. Y. 1911); Thomas v. Cincinnati, N. 0. & T. P. Ry., 77 Fed. 667 (S. D.
Ohio 1896); Clyde v. Richmond & D. R. R., 63 Fed. 21 (D. S. C. 1894).
In Clyde v. Richmond & D. R. R., supra, remaining in possession of the leased prop-
erty beyond the "reasonable time" was held to amount to an adoption of the lease by the
receivers. In Gaston v. Rutland R. R., supra, it was held that a lease, though once re-
jected, had been reinstated and adopted by the receivers when they accepted an offer of
the lessor to permit them to use the leased line on the same terms as the previously dis-
affirmed lease. Though such instances exist, actions taken by receivers within the "rea-
sonable time" have generally not been held to constitute adoption unless a "positive indi-
cation" of their intent to take over the lease is present. Peabody Coal Co. v. Nixon,
supra. Negotiations looking to a modification of the existing lease will not ordinarily be
held to amount to adoption. Carswell v. Farmers Loan & Trust Co., 74 Fed. 88 (C. C.
A. 6th, 1896) ; Pennsylvania Steel Co. v. New York City Ry., 192 Fed. 135 (S. D. N. Y.
1911); Platt v. Philadelphia & R. R. R., 84 Fed. 535 (C. C. A. 3d, 1898); Thomas v.
Cincinnati, N. 0. & T. P. Ry., 77 Fed. 667 (S. D. Ohio 1896).
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that the burden of showing such informal affirmance rests with the lessor,
although this has not been stated by the courts in so many words. How-
ever, care has been taken in proceedings under Section 77 and in present
day equity reorganizations, as well, that no act of the trustees or receivers
shall be construed as an adoption of any lease. Ordinarily the initial
order approving the petition specifies that "no conduct or user of rights
by the Debtor or payments made by the Debtor as rent or otherwise,
. . . or any other acts or omissions by the Debtor" except the formal
notice, shall be deemed to constitute an election to adopt any lease. 8
THE EFFECTS OF ADOPTION
During the pendency of the reorganization proceeding, the same conse-
quences ensue upon adoption of a lease under Section 77 as in equity.
In both instances the terms of the lease will be in effect throughout the
entire proceeding. In equity, whether or not after adoption of a lease
by the receiver, the company organized to take over the lessee's properties
on foreclosure sale would be required to assume the lease is not entirely
clear. Decrees of sale exist which have permitted the purchasers to elect
whether to adopt or reject leases. Such power, however, does not seem
to have extended to leases previously adopted by the receiver, but only to
those upon which no action was taken during the reorganization pro-
ceeding.7" Nevertheless, it seems, as a practical matter, that adoption by
a receiver has usually meant that the lease would be assumed unmodified
by the new company. In proceedings under Section 77, however, a second
opportunity to elect has been specifically conferred by subsection (b) of
the statute, which provides that a plan of reorganization "may reject
contracts of the debtor which are executory in whole or in part, including
unexpired leases.""0 Despite this express grant of authority in the
78. Chicago, 11. St. P. & P. Proceeding, Order No. 1 (June 29, 1935), Court Record
49. For variations in language, see Denver & Rio Grande V. Proceeding, Order No. 1,
Court Record 8 and Chicago & Great Vester Proceeding, Order No. 1 (Feb. 23, 1935),
Court Record 5, where the orders merely provided that "continued operation" and "per-
formance of any such lease!' should not constitute adoption of any lease. As to the
effectiveness of such provisions, see Kansas City Pipe Line Co. v. Fidelity Title & Trust
Co., 217 Fed. 187 (C. C. A. 8th, 1914).
79. See Chicago Great Western Equity Proceeding (Humbird v. Chicago G. AV.
Ry.), Final Decree (July 10, 1909) Court Record 347, 358; Minneapolis & St. L Equity
Proceeding, Final Decree (Jan. 8, 1929, as amended). Kansas City Terminal Ry. v.
Central Union Trust Co., 28 F. (2d) 177, 180 (C. C. A. 8th, 1928). See also the final
decree in the Erie Reorgazi:ation of 1896. One group of writers has indicated the pur-
chaser was not bound by a receiver's adoption of a lease in the absence of a provision in
the decree of sale imposing the obligation upon it. See Clark, Foley and Shaw, op. cit.
supra note 39, at 1127.
80. Subsection (b) further provides: "The adoption of an executory contract or
unex-pired lease by the trustee or trustees of a debtor shall not preclude a rejection of
such contract or lease in a plan of reorganization approved hereunder, and any claim
resulting from such rejection shall not have priority over any other claims because such
contract or lease had been previously adopted."
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statute, it does not seem likely that reorganization plans in Section 77
proceedings will often reject leases which previously have been adopted.
In no pending reorganization in which plans have been proposed by the
Interstate Commerce Commission has such a proposal been made, and it
is probable that rejection in a plan of reorganization will occur only in
unusual cases where a radical alteration in circumstances has taken place
between the date of adoption by the trustees and confirmation of the
plan. Consequently, upon adoption by the trustees it can be said that the
lessor may reasonably look forward to fulfillment of the lease contract.
THE EFFECTS OF REJECTION
It is upon the election of the trustees to reject a lease that the prob-
lems of the lessor interests become most apparent, for such action pre-
sumably means that the trustees have concluded either that the leased
line has no value whatever to the lessee's system, or that, although per-
haps of some value, it still would, under the terms of the lease, be
burdensome to the estate which they are administering. In either event
the lessor interests must act to protect themselves, and, if the situation
is the former, at least salvage what they can; if the latter, seek to prevent
unvarranted modification of the lease.
In the main, upon rejection four questions will appear which must be
answered during the course of the reorganization proceedings. Upon the
answers to these questions, together with the answer to the fundamental
and primary question of the value of the leased line, the ultimate fate
of the lessor interests in the reorganization will chiefly depend. These
questions are:
(1) Is it necessary and advisable for the lessor to be placed in equity
receivership or to file under Section 77?
(2) Who will operate the leased line during the proceeding for re-
organization of the lessee?
(3) If the trustees for the debtor lessee operate the leased line, how
will such operations be accounted for?
(4) What claims against the lessee will the lessor and its security
holders have for breach of the lessee's covenants in the lease?
1. Status of the lessor upon rejection. It will be recalled that the
typical lessor is little more than a corporate shell, whose activities, save
for such formal acts as are needed to maintain its corporate existence,
have almost completely ceased. Payment of its bond interest, dividends
and taxes has ordinarily been taken care of directly by the lessee under
the terms of the lease, and even if actually handled by the lessor, such
payments have for the most part involved purely mechanical activity.
The lessor's treasury is ordinarily bare of sizeable funds, and if payments
under the lease cease, it is not likely to have any other source of income.
[Vol. 49: 626
HeinOnline  -- 49 Yale L. J. 652 1939-1940
RAILROAD LEASES
If the lessor has bonds outstanding, it will consequently be unable to
pay the bond interest and all the consequences of such non-payment may
follow. Even if no bonds are outstanding, taxes upon its properties will
continue to accrue. Without resources, the lessor company itself is not
apt to be well prepared to wage an effective fight in the reorganization
and the burden of financing such a fight will presumably fall upon the
holders of its securities.-'
Under these Eircumstances and with the probability that its own
security structure will have to be readjusted, the institution of reor-
ganization proceedings for the lessor may possibly be the only prac-
•ticable course. While resort to equity presumably is possible, under
Section 77 several preliminary questions arise. Will the lessor petition
for reorganization under Section 77 separately or in the same proceeding
with its lessee? As originally enacted in 1933, Section 77 provided for
two types of situations where a lessor could file a petition with the court
having jurisdiction of the debtor lessee and ask to be reorganized "in
connection with or as part of" the reorganization of tie lessee. One
was where the debtor owned the majority of stock of "any corporation ;"
the other where the debtor operated substantially all the properties of
the lessor under a lease.8 2 Both situations were affected by the 1935
amendments to Section 77, the first by a provision that only "railroad"
corporations, rather than "any," corporations, in which the debtor lessee
owned a majority of the capital stock "having power to vote for the
election of directors" could file in the lessee's proceeding.1 The second
was completely eliminated.84 As a consequence majority stock control
of the lessor by the debtor lessee is now a sine qua non to the lessor's
power to file a petition in the lessee's proceeding, and it has been accepted
that a railroad lessor is a "railroad" corporation within the statute.
If the lessee has a majority stock interest in the lessor, and if the
lessor accordingly seeks reorganization under Section 77 in its lessee's
proceeding, unified administration of the properties of lessee and lessor
under the same trustees is possible."' Even if majority stock ownership
by the lessee is absent, it is still possible for the lessor to file a completely
81. Although this may be true at the outset of the proceeding, nevertheless it seems
to be clear that, within the limits prescribed by subsection (c12) uf Section 77, the
activities of the lessor interests may be compensated out of the estate of the lessor, if the
lessor also is in reorganization, and perhaps even out of the estate of the lessee. In any
event the procedure prescribed by subsection (c)(12) will have to he followed, with
maximum permissible allowances being fixed by the ICC.
82. 47 STAT. 1474 (1933) (repealed).
83. 49 STAT. 911 (1935), 11 U. S. C. § 205 (Supp. 1938).
84. The removal of this provision is ably criticized in Friendly, The 1935 Amend-
ment of thc Railroad Reorganization Act (1936) 36 CoL. L. Rnv. 1, 49.
85. If a possibility of adversity of interests should arise, the court may appoint special
counsel to represent the lessor's estate.
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independent petition in the court having charge of the lessee's proceed-
ing, provided the lessor's principal executive office is in the territorial
jurisdiction of that court and its lines are not wholly within a single
state in a different jurisdiction. However, if this is done, unlike the
situation where the lessor files as a subsidiary, separate proceedings are
necessary for the two companies, and presumably different trustees would
be appointed.
If the lessor's principal executive office is in a territorial jurisdiction
other than that of the court in which the lessee is being reorganized,
the lessor cannot file in the same court as the lessee and the two pro-
ceedings must be conducted in different courts. This at once may present
problems. The trustees appointed for the lessor will almost certainly be
different from persons appointed for the lessee. With two courts and
two sets of trustees involved, opportunities for disputes, especially as to
jurisdiction, may be multiplied. Particularly may this be so concerning
matters arising out of the operation of the lessor's properties, since, as
a practical matter, the court administering the lessor's proceeding will
in all probability have to provide for the continued operation of these
properties by the lessee's trustees, at least for the time being."
If the lessor files under Section 77 in the lessee's proceeding, and if
the lessee's trustees are appointed trustees of the lessor also, the powers
previously given to them in the former capacity will simply be granted
to them as trustees of the lessor, and in matters affecting both estates
they will act as trustees of both estates. Where the lessor's proceeding
is in another court and different trustees are appointed, it will progress
as an independent proceeding under Section 77, with such exceptions
as may necessarily arise out of the operation of the lessor's properties
by the lessee's trustees. In both cases, the lessor's trustees will be charged
with the preservation of the lessor's estate for its creditors, one aspect
of which, for example, may be the initiation of efforts to obtain relief
from burdensome obligations, including contracts and leases, which the
lessor itself may have entered into prior to leasing its properties to its
own lessee.
86. In one proceeding under Section 77 the lessor's trustees under such circumstances
have contested the jurisdiction of the court administering the lessee's proceeding to deter-
mine, as between the two estates, the accounting for such operation prior to disafflirmance.
In re New York, N. H. & H. R. R., 26 F. Supp. 28 (D. Conn. 1939), (1939) 52 I-IAIV.
L. REv. 1356, modified sub norn. Warren v. Palmer, C. C. A. 2d, Dec. 18, 1939. An appli-
cation for writ of certiorari from the decision of the Circuit Court of Appeals for the
Second Circuit is pending as this is written. The case involves the question of whether
the district court administering the lessee's reorganization and operating the lessor's
properties with the approval of the lessor's court had jurisdiction, as against the lessor's
court (a separate district court in another circuit), to determine the amount of the claim
of the lessee's trustees against the lessor's estate for deficits incurred in the operation of
the lessor's line for the lessor's account, and to impose a prior lien for that amount upon
the lessor's properties, which were in the custody of the lessee's trustees.
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2. Operation of the leased line before and after rejection. As we have
seen, at the time reorganization of the lessee is commenced, the lessor
ordinarily will not be in a position to resume the operation of its own
line. Nor could it do so immediately if it were able, because under most
leases there must first be default in payment of rent, followed by a period
usually of at least thirty days, before the lessor can take steps to declare
the lease forfeited and to reenter its property. Even after such default
and such subsequent period the lessor may be prevented from reentering;
for if, nevertheless, a reasonable time for the lessee's trustees to elect
to adopt or reject has not yet elapsed, the reorganization court can
restrain the lessor from interfering with the possession of the leased line
by the trustees. It has recently been stated that the right of the trustees
to such a reasonable time is paramount to the lessor's right to reenter
after breach of the lease.87 Consequently, as a practical matter even a
lessor which is able and willing to reenter is in a difficult position, inas-
much as the court is not apt of its own volition to determine whether
a reasonable time has elapsed or not. If the right of reentry is to be
worth anything at all, plainly the lessor must take the initiative in forcing
a determination of that question. On the other hand, in the more usual
situation where the lessor is unable to resume operation either itself or
by arrangement with another railway system, it will benefit from the
continued operation of the leased line which it is the duty of the court
to insure in the public interest. Indeed, it has been held that a demand
by the lessor for return of its property when it is unable to resume opera-
tion is not made in good faith and for that reason will be given no
effectss
Consequently, unless the lessor is actually ready and able to take back
its properties and operate them and takes steps to that end, it would
seem unlikely that operation of its property by the lessee's receiver or
trustees will be affected prior to election to adopt or reject the lease. But
upon rejection the situation changes and in a proceeding under Section 77,
subsection (c) (6) comes into play. This subsection provides as follows:
"If a lease of a line of railroad is rejected, and if the lessee, with
the approval of the judge, shall elect no longer to operate the leased
line, it shall be the duty of the lessor at the end of a period to be
fixed by the judge to begin the operation of such line, unless the
judge, upon the petition of the lessor, shall decree after hearing that
it would be impracticable and contrary to the public interest for the
lessor to operate the said line, in which event it shall be the duty of
the lessee to continue operation on or for the account of the lessor
until the abandonment of such line is authorized by the Commission
87. Palmer v. Palmer, 104 F. (2d) 161 (C. C. A. 2d, 1939), cert. denied, 60 Sup.
Ct. 120, 121 (U. S. 1939).
88. American Brake Shoe & Foundry Co. v. New York Rys., 282 Fed. 523 (C. C. A.
2d, 1922).
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in accordance with the provisions of Section 1 of the Interstate Com-
merce Act as amended."
By speaking at the outset of the lessee's right, subject to the approval
of the judge, to elect "no longer to operate the leased line," and then
later requiring the lessee to continue operation of "said line" if the judge
finds it impracticable and contrary to the public interest for the lessor
to do so, the first portion of this subsection appears to mean that the
lessee's trustees may, absent such a finding by the judge, turn over the
operation of the entire leased line to the lessor without first obtaining
the approval of the ICC. That this was the intent seems to be even
more clearly indicated by the language making it the "duty" of the lessor
to begin operation of its line, and the fact that judge makes the finding
"upon petition of lessor." In situations apart from equity as well as
Section 77 the approval of the ICC under Section 1(18) of the Inter-
state Commerce Act has apparently been regarded by it as necessary
before abandonment of operation of a leased line by the lessee."' And
there are instances in which the ICC has exercised jurisdiction over
similar abandonments of operation by lessee's receivers in equity, after
the lease has been rejected." Under Section 77 the question of whether
subsection (c) (6) was intended to permit the lessee's trustees, without
first obtaining approval of the ICC, to turn over operation of the leased
line to a lessor ready and able to resume its operation is as yet unanswered,
for in proceedings pending under the statute, operation of the leased
lines involved has, after rejection, been continued by the lessee's trustees
for the account of the lessor pursuant to the final clause of subsection
(c) (6).
But apart from this question, it would at least seem clear that the
first clause of subsection (c) (6) is concerned with abandonment of oper-
ation of the leased line in its entirety by the lessee's trustees. Since the
concluding portion of that subsection apparently deals with complete
physical abandonment of the leased line,"' no attempt seems to have been
89. Lehigh Valley Proposed Abandonment, 202 1. C. C. 659 (1935) (lease had ex-
pired). But in this case the lessor made no effort to resume operation of its line. Cf.
Operation by Louisiana & A. Ry., 145 I. C. C. 228 (1928) ; Chicago & A. R. R. v. Toledo,
P. & W. Ry., 146 I. C. C. 171 (1928), Commissioner Eastman dissenting. This question
does not, however, appear to have been passed upon by the courts.
90. Norfolk & S. R. R., Receiver's Abandonment, 221 I. C. C. 258 (1937) ; Seaboard
Air Line Ry., Receiver's Abandonment, 202 I. C. C. 543 (1934), Commissioner Mahaffie,
dissenting. This question does not appear to have been passed upon by the courts. But
the lessor need not apply to the ICC for authority to resume operation of its line after
default of the lessee's receivers. Norfolk & S. R. R., Receiver's Abandonment, 221
I. C. C. 258, 260 (1937).
91. See Friendly, supra note 84, at 48. Subsection (o) of Section 77, dealing with
complete physical abandonment, is, of course, available to trustees of a lessor undergoing
reorganization. In addition, it is available to the trustees of the lessee in connection with
complete physical abandonment of all or part of the leased line. See note 97 infra.
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made in this subsection to cover one other important field of action with
respect to operation of the leased line by the lessee's trustees, that is,
partial abandonment of operation by curtailment and partial discontinu-
ance of service." The procedure for effecting such partial abandonment
may, under certain circumstances, become a matter of considerable im-
portance, as, for example, where it may be anticipated that elimination of
unprofitable services will bring about more favorable segregation results.
This was substantially the situation in the recent Supreme Court case
of Pahner v. Conimonwealth,03 which involved one phase of the pending
New Haven reorganization proceeding. The trustees of the New Haven,
who were operating the Old Colony's lines pursuant to subsection (c) (6)
after disaffirmance of the Old Colony's lease, applied to the Massachumetts
Department of Public Utilities for leave to abandon eighty-eight pas-
senger stations in Massachusetts, most of which were located on the
lines of the Old Colony, which was being operated at a large deficit.
Hearings before that body were prolonged to such an extent that, ap-
parently despairing of any action by the state authorities, the lessor
interests petitioned the reorganization court for an order directing the
trustees to abandon these local services. The court, after hearing, granted
the relief sought. * This decision was reversed by the Circuit Court of
Appeals for the Second Circuit, with one Judge dissenting.5
The Supreme Court's decision, sustaining the circuit court, was inter-
preted in some quarters as a triumph for the 'Massachusetts authorities.
Analysis of Mr. justice Frankfurter's opinion, however, points to the
conclusion that the victory, though complete prior to confirmation of
a plan, nevertheless was more pyrrhic than otherwise. Curtailment and
partial discontinuance of railroad service are, it was noted in the opinion,
matters over which the powers of the states have been preserved in spite
of gradual expansion of federal control over other purely intrastate
activities of interstate carriers. In order to withdraw this "old and
familiar" power from the states, Congress must be found to have used
language appropriate to so drastic a change. Such language Mr. justice
Frankfurter was unable to find in Section 77 except in connection with
the plan of reorganization, and indeed, he said, the interrelation between
the jurisdiction of the ICC and that of the district court which Section
77 creates, indicates that Congress did not intend matters of this kind
to be decided by the district court without the assistance and approval
of the ICC. However, since the statute gives the ICC no jurisdiction
over such matters prior to its action upon a complete plan of reorgan-
92. And properly so, since such partial abandonment of operation may be .arranted
on lines other than those subject to leases which have been rejected by the trustees.
93. 60 Sup. Ct. 34 (U. S. 1939).
94. New Haven Proceeding, Order No. 2S9 (July 9, 1933), Court Record 4544.
95. Sub nom. Converse v. Commonvealth, 101 F. (2d) 4S (C. C. A. 2d, 1933).
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ization for the debtor, until the point for confirmation of a plan is reached,
the power of state regulatory bodies is paramount. But tinder the clear
authority of subsection (f) of Section 77, it is plain the ICC may include
provisions in the plan of reorganization which it approves and which
do "supplant state authority" with respect to precisely the type of ques-
tion before the Supreme Court.9 Nevertheless, many questions will
probably arise in this connection. 7
Turning to the final clause of subsection (c) (6), other difficulties are
apparent. Assuming the district court has decreed that it is impracticable
and contrary to the public interest for the lessor to operate, how long
must the lessee's trustees continue to operate? Can such operation be
required to continue if the leased line is operated at a deficit which can
only be met by the appropriation of funds from the estate of the lessee?
Can the lessor reenter at a subsequent time, when able to prove its ability
to operate? All these, and doubtless other problems, are latent within
the statutory language. From one standpoint, this final clause would
seem to be designed merely as a temporary solution of what to do with
the leased line. So interpreted, it would contemplate operation by the
lessee's trustees only until some other arrangement is made, and would
be no bar to subsequent reentry by the lessor, to a merger or consolida-
tion with the reorganized lessee, should that be desirable, or to some
different disposition of the leased line.98 On the other hand, since lines
whose leases have been rejected have often been distinct liabilities to their
lessees, the statutory language can be regarded as contemplating primarily
either of two things: resumption of operation by the former lessor,
either at once or after a period in which to make the necessary prepara-
tions, or complete physical abandonment of the line.
In pending proceedings under Section 77, few of these questions have
thus far been raised. Upon .disaffirmance, lessor companies have in most
instances, promptly or within a brief period thereafter, filed petitions
under Section 77, ordinarily as subsidiary debtors, if able to meet the
96. Subsection (f) provides: "Upon confirmation of a plan, the debtor and other
corporation . . . organized . . . for the purpose of carrying out the plan, shall have
full power and authority to, and shall put into effect and carry out the plan and the
orders of the judge relative thereto, under and subject to the supervision and control of
the judge, the laws of any State or the decision or order of any State authority to the
contrary notwithstanding."
97. For example, is it intended that the reorganization plan shall specify in detail
the services to be discontinued, and the curtailments to take place? What evidence must
be introduced before the ICC to support such provisions? When can such curtailments
and discontinuances, if approved by the ICC, be put into effect?
98. Subsection (b) provides: "A plan of reorganization within the meaning of this
section . . . (5) shall provide adequate means for the execution of the plan, which may
include . . . the merger or consolidation of the debtor with another corporation or
corporations."
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jurisdictional requirements." These petitions have been treated not only
as petitions under Section 77, but also, in effect, as petitions under sub-
section (c) (6) for a decree that the lessee should, at least for the time
being, continue to operate the leased line in the public interest for the
account of the lessor.100
(This Article will be concluded in a subsequent issue)
99. Erie Proceeding, Petition No. 54 (June 29, 1938), Court Record 571; New Haven
Proceeding, Petition No. 74 (June 3, 1936), Court Record 731; Denver & Rio Grande
Western Proceeding, Petition No. 2 (Oct. 30, 1935), Court Record 17.
100. However, even if the lessor does not file under Section 77, it can, of course, file
the petition described in subsection (c) (6) requesting continuance of operation by the
lessee's trustees. For example, in the Erie Rcorganication, the Avon, Geneseo & Mt.
'Morris R. R. petitioned the court administering its lessee's reorganization for leave to
intervene and for an order directing the lessee's trustees to perform the lease in full.
(Court Record 1443-1454). Intervention was granted but determination of the remain-
ing matters was reserved. (Court Record 1465-1466). Subsequently, in a petition which
alleged that studies showed the total expenses of operating the leased line to be greater
than the total operating revenues, the lessee's trustees asked the court to approve their
election no longer to operate the leased line, and to fix a time at the end of which it
would become the duty of the Avon to resume operation of its own properties. (Court
Record 1469-1470). This election ,as approved and determination of the other matter
reserved. (Court Record 1483-1485). Thereafter the Avon petitioned the court for a
finding that it was impracticable and contrary to the public interest for it to operate its
properties, and for an order directing the lessee's trustees to operate the property for the
account of the lessee's estate, pending decision by the ICC on an abandonment applica-
tion previously filed by the Avon. (Court Record 1473-1477). The court found it im-
practicable for the Avon to resume operation, but directed the lessee's trustees to oper-
ate the leased line for the Avon's account from the date of the order. (Court Record
1541). The lessee's trustees then sought the court's permission to join in the Avon's
abandonment application, which was granted, together with authority to abandon the
line upon issuance by the ICC of the necessary certificate. (Court Record 1559-1562,
1565-1566).
Subsection (o) of Section 77 grants the ICC jurisdiction over complete abandonment
of property of the debtor. Accordingly, where trustees have been appointed for the
lessor, applications in their names fall directly within the subsection. Where, as in the
case of the Avon, trustees have not been appointed, nevertheless the ICC's jurisdiction
over application by the lessee's trustees cannot be questioned in view of § 1 (18) of the
Interstate Commerce Act. Central A. & E. R. R.. Trustee's Abandonment, 221 I. C. C.
170 (1937).
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